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PRAYER IN PUBLIC SCHOOLSt
JOSEPH F. COSTANZO, S.J.*

to define with precision the constitutional
issue involved in Engel v. Vitale.' The issue was not simply prayer
in public schools. No legal power can prevent a student from reciting
privately his prayers while sitting in the school library or standing in the
schoolyard provided he does not interfere with any academic assignments or with prescribed recreational employments. All prayer is personal, all prayer is a religious exercise, wheresoever it is said, in private
or public institutions, and on every occasion. No description of prayer
as ceremonial deprives it of its religious nature and meaning. Only the
internal dispositions and, secondarily, the outward demeanor of a private individual or of a public official, determine whether he is truly
praying or not. Prayer is always and on every occasion a religious exercise or it is not prayer at all. A ceremonial prayer which is not a religious act is a contradiction in terms.
Prayer may be individual when one prays by himself or even in the
midst of others for his own intentions. And prayer may also be corporate as when several pray together in unison for one another, or for
a purpose common to all of them. Corporate prayer may be at home as
when a family prays together, or in a house of worship when a congregation professing the same creed takes part in a common liturgy. Corporate prayer may also be civic as when fellow citizens voluntarily unite
to pray to God for divine blessings upon their country. From the earliest
days of our history, it has been a time-honored and cherished tradition
for our people to respond in prayer at the official request of government
authorities on solemn public occasions, in times of impending peril,
T IS WELL AT THE OUTSET
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during war and in peace. Men, women and
children of different religious confessions

and church affiliations united by the common bond of belief in God have joined
their hearts and minds in a corporate act
of prayer for the preservation, survival and
prosperity of America. Civic corporate
prayer has been one of the most effective
unifying spiritual bonds in our national
history.
In the case before the high tribunal, no
one disputed that prayer was a religious
act. The Court admitted the absence of

regulatory compulsion and punitive coercion. 2 The prayer in its simple wording was
Justice Douglas made these detailed admissions
in his concurring opinion: "First a word as to
what this case does not involve. Plainly, our
Bill of Rights would not permit a State or the
Federal Government to adopt an official prayer
and penalize anyone who would not utter it.
This, however, is not that case, for there is no
element of compulsion or coercion in New
York's regulation requiring that public schools
be opened each day with the . . . prayer ...
The prayer is said upon the commencement of
the school day, immediately following the Pledge
of Allegiance to the flag. The prayer is said
aloud in the presence of a teacher, who either
leads the recitation or selects a student to do
so. No student, however, is compelled to take
part. The respondents have adopted a regulation which provides that 'neither teachers nor
any school authority shall comment on participation or non-participation . . . nor suggest
or request that any posture or language be used
or dress be worn or be not used or not worn.'
Provision is also made for excusing children,
upon written request of a parent or guardian,
from the saying of the prayer or from the room
in which the prayer is said. A letter implementing and explaining this regulation has been sent
to each taxpayer and parent in the school district. As I read this regulation, a child is free
to stand or not stand, to recite or not to recite,
without fear of reprisal or even comment by the
teacher or any other school official. In short,
the only one who need utter the prayer is the
teacher; and no teacher is complaining of it.
Students can stand mute or even leave the class-

1962

a solemn declaration of belief in the existence of Almighty God and a public acknowledgement of our dependence upon God
as a nation as well as individually. There
was no intent or effect of "teaching" a new
belief in God. 3 The prayer was an open
affirmation of a faith already possessed by
every participant. The approval of the parents incontestably upholds this fact. The
prohibition against any comments on the
prayer was to ensure this fact. Voluntary
participation and liberty of exemption gave
the widest possible scope to personal response of conscience.
An Establishment of Religion

2

room, if they desire."
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The Supreme Court ruled that because
the prayer had been composed by a governmental agency it fell under the ban of
the no establishment clause. Now this cardinal argument of the Court on governmental composition may not really be as
telling as it seems. If by composition it is
understood that the prayer originated in
wording and meaning wholly with the New
York Board of Regents and entirely on
their own initiative then the argument is
without foundation. The New York educational authorities were motivated in part
by the broad public consensus authentically embodied in our national documents
on the religious foundations of our Republic and, in part, by the rights and anxieties
3Mr. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion,
stated: "In the present case, school facilities are
used to say the prayer and the teaching staff is
employed to lead the pupils in it. There is, however, no effort at indoctrination and no attempt
at exposition. Prayers of course may be so long
and of such a character as to amount to an
attempt at the religious instruction that was
denied by the McCollum case. But New York's
prayer is of a character that does not involve
any element of proselytizing as in the McCollun270
case."
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of religious-minded parents of students in
the public schools. They were guided in
the writing of the prayer in context and in
words by state constitutions, by congressional resolutions and laws, by presidential
acts, and by practices in the judiciary. Fifty
state constitutions, in one way or another,
acknowledge their dependence upon Divine
Providence, express their gratitude to God
as the Author of our civil and religious
liberties, and pray for His continuing guidance and counsel in their government deliberations. In addition to legislative and
military chapels and chaplaincies, acts of
the national Congress and other deliberative assemblies have called for days of
prayer through executive proclamations.
The day after the national Congress passed
the proposal which became the first amendment, it passed a resolution calling for the
designation of "a day of public thanksgiving and prayer." This tradition of civic corporate prayer at the invitation of government officials has been, with but two exceptions, unbroken from the days of George
Washington to the present administration.
More precisely to the issue at hand, the
Congress has officially prescribed and
adopted the divine invocation on our coinage and currency, in the national anthem
and motto, and in the Pledge of Allegiance
to the flag. What the New York Board of
Regents did was neither novel nor original.
Only in a minimal sense-almost only in
the capacity of an amanuensis-may it be
said to be their composition. They simply
gave expression to what the American people and their duly elected representatives
have ratified and adopted in every decade
4
of our national history.

Some few reassuring voices insist that
the Court decision might not proscribe the
optional recitation of a prayer composed
by nonofficials. But the fact and the law are
that whatever takes place permissively in a
state school under official supervision or
conduct necessarily involves governmental
responsibility to some degree or another. It
is respectfully submitted that the high tribunal over-exaggerated the significance of
the role of the New York Board of Regents in the construction of the prayer
and foresaw potential dangers to Church
and State wholly out of proportion to its
real intent. It may be said that not every
and any government involvement in a religious act is eo ipso suspect and tainted with
unconstitutionality. One must look to the
context, purpose, and concrete circum-

While the majority opinion written by Mr.
Justice Black pivots the decision technically on
governmental composition of the prayer, con-

missioner of Education ruled that a part of

4

strued as one of the exercises of a proscribed
state-established church under the ban of the
first amendment, Mr. Justice Douglas, on the
other hand, settles upon governmental financing

of religious exercises. Both the majority and
concurring opinions isolate elements of statechurch establishment, elements which by themselves are not necessarily derivative of nor con-

ducive to state-church establishment. Indeed a
governmental composition of a prayer-not any
prayer-and certain governmental financing of
religious exercises may be justifiably sustained
by the religious liberty clause. (In the instant

case, there was greater use of what was already financed. An additional specific expenditure of public funds was not entailed by the
optional recitation of the New York prayer.)
In severing these elements from one another, the
way is paved for absolutizing an isolated ele-

ment into a constitutional barrier whether or
not anyone suffers an infringement of religious
liberty and without reg~ird to the equal protection which the law should extend to all, believer
and nonbeliever, consentient and dissident. Such
an absolutizing process gradually expands from
a narrow legalism to a broad premise of proscription. Only recently, the New York ComThe Star-Spangled Banner may not be used as

a school prayer. The radical source of the an-
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stances of the religious act to ascertain its
constitutional propriety. One would suppose that an officially prepared civic corporate prayer, publicly known, approved
and consented to in advance, might have
been favorably viewed as a calculated precaution to ensure the necessary constitutional safeguards against any surprise encroachments upon a sectarian conscience by
the impromptu prayer of a well-meaning
student or teacher. Of two likely opposing
interpretations, the Court chose the negative one. The pivotal question may well
have turned on the rights of religiousminded parents and school children to
choose freely to participate in an official
prayer modeled on our national documents,
in an educational program, to impress upon
the school children the moral and spiritual
tinomies which have been inserted by court interpretation into the religious clauses of the first
amendment is the as yet unsettled legal question (historically, there appears to be less doubt
about it) whether the two clauses, dealing with
no establishment and free exercise, are so correspondent to one another that an adjudication
under one clause may not be at the expense
of the legal guarantees of the other, or whether
the two clauses may be interpreted in exclusive
isolation to one another. Until and unless this
question of the interrelationship of the two
clauses is resolved, the absolutist construction
of the no establishment clause which Mr. Justice
Rutledge put forth in his dissenting opinion in
Everson and which the Court adopted in McColluin is likely to prevail over the original
authentic meaning of no establishment as explained by James Madison in his rejoinders to
questions put to him in the debates of Congress. The danger involved in the absolutist interpretation is that the judiciary may over-reach
itself by preempting the democratic political
process and embodying on its own initiative
public policy into constitutional law. In Zorach,
the possibilities of relating the two religious
clauses to one another harmoniously in specific
programs of mutual accommodation seemed an
implementation of Mr. Justice Black's assertion
in Everson about "the interrelationship of these

values which have been recognized as the
basis of our free society.
Ancienit History and Modern Law
As if to give substance to its fears about
an official prayer, the Court reached back
to sixteenth-century England and the Common Prayer Book which the Established
Church imposed upon a nation. The employment of history in the determination
of cases should be subject to more rigorous
canons of constitutional relevance than was
exercised in the ruling on prayer. The
Common Prayer Book and its succeeding
amended versions was composed by the
Established Church of England with the
deliberate intent of effectuating revolutionary doctrinal changes-at first upon those
unsuspecting faithful who still clung to
complementary clauses" and his warning against
interjecting a religious discriminatory norm into
the first amendment.
Another source of ambiguity is the fear of
the extent to which government aid to religion
may go. To date, the Court has not yet formulated practical norms beyond which the political
process may not extend. The wide variety of
legislative precedents from the beginning of the
Republic to this day of governmental financing
of religious life directly, indirectly, and incidently offers the greatest obstacles to the judicial construction of such norms. Perhaps in the
last resort, public opinion may provide the practical wisdom to which intercredal dialogues
hope to make sensible contributions. Some constitutional lawyers have opposed a "neutral principle" to the principle of neutrality in the area
of federal aid to education. This neutral principle looks to the standard of public function
and will not allow religion to be the cause for
action or inaction because the religious clauses
of the first amendment prohibit classification
that would entail conferment of a benefit or
the imposition of a burden. Under this neutral principle, the prayer case might have turned
on the question whether civic corporate prayer
was indeed a constitutionally justifiable exercise for the promotion of an educational program to foster in school children moral and
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articles of faith according to papal teaching after the breach with Rome, and in the
following century, upon alert and vigorously resisting Puritans. It was deliberately
designed not only to change ancient ceremonial administration of the sacraments,
but its wording was calculated to instill in
the people the new theological doctrines of
the Episcopal Church touching upon the
meaning, substance, and validity of the
sacramental rites. The Common Prayer
Book was an instrument of radical credal
changes prescribed for the willing and the
unwilling, for the knowledgeable and the
unknowing, and the English government
was a party to this.5
The New York prayer was not a surprise
encroachment upon sectarian confessions;
it conformed with beliefs already held, it
was imposed on no one, it was recommended to all, it was freely adopted by the
local school board, and in the instant case,
voluntarily participated in by all school
children with the approval of their parents,
with but one exemption-the highest degree of near unanimity possible.
The constitutional relevance of sixteenthand seventeenth-century English history was
without any substantive analogy to the New
York case. The resort to the historical past
does not enlighten if it serves to evoke
ancient fears and premonitions out of tune
with our times and our sensibilities. Americans have a right to fashion their own
spiritual values which have been traditionally
part of our national heritage. The determination of this precise issue would in turn rest on
the ulterior question whether it is part of the
public function of tax-supported schools to transmit the spiritual heritage of the nation as it is
authentically embodied in the official acts and

the authoritative documents of American history.
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constitutional history in church-state relations without being burdened by the memories of religious wars and animosities of
their distant forebears.
Perhaps in an effort to bolster the weakness of the historical analogy, the Court
sought to bridge the span of centuries and
the disparity of national experiences by the
use of a "bad tendency" rule together with
an agreement based on indirect coercive
pressure. The majority opinion said that "a
union of government and religion tends to
destroy government and to degrade religion." To which we would add that when
government encourages religious life as part
of its spiritual heritage, it strengthens itself and enhances religious liberty. And
both the dark and bright lessons of history
will illustrate that the governments which
show impartial accommodations for the
exercise of religious liberty to all are the
wonder of mankind and the hope of all
churches. As for the indirect coercive pressure, it is no more-perhaps even lessthan what might be inferred from voluntary
salute to the flag with or without the divine
reference, in the singing of the national anthem and in the program of released time
for religious instruction.
It is no small cause for wonder that in
all of the first amendment cases touching
upon education and religion, at no time
does the Court, in resorting to Jefferson,
ever consider Jefferson's own plans for
lower and higher education which he drew
up for his own state of Virginia upon his
retirement from the presidency. His educational plans of 18146, 18177, 18188, 18221,
G

JEFFERSON,

in

THE

Plan for An Educational System,

COMPLETE JEFFERSON

over ed. 1943) [hereinafter cited

1064-69 (Pad-

as PADOVER].
7 JEFFERSON,
An Act for Establishing Elementary Schools, in PADOVER 1072, 1076.

8
and 182410 disclose three principles to be
permanent in Jefferson's mind. First, that a
totally non-religious education is defective.
Secondly, government is to offer impartial
encouragement and, if need be, accommodations to expressions of religious life in state
schools. Thirdly, in the manner of mutual
accommodation and cooperative relationship, neither government nor religion is to
lose any measure of its proper competence
and independent jurisdiction. Jefferson never
construed such cordial arrangements and
mutual adjustments as tantamount to a
union of Church and State which tends to
destroy the one and degrade the other. If
the high tribunal was in search of Jefferson's mind on a practice that bore some
substantial constitutional analogy to the
New York prayer it might have examined
his draft for the establishment of state elementary schools which the Virginia Assembly enacted into law in 1817. In the
eleventh provision of the act we read:
The said teachers shall, in all things relating
to education and government of their pupils, be under the direction and control of
the visitors; but no religious reading, instruction or exercise shall be prescribed or
practiced inconsistent with the tenets of any
religious sect or denomination.
For Jefferson there was only one absolute
and all controlling restriction on afiy religious exercise or instruction in the elementary grades; that it be not inconsistent
with the confessional tenets of the school
children. He was most anxious to guard the
religious conscience of all minors against
the more learned persuasion of adult in8 JEFFERSON, The University of Virginia, Aim

and Curriculum, in

PADOVER

1097, 1104.

Freedom of Religion at the University of Virginia, in PADOVER 957-58.
10 JEFFERSON, Regulations for the University,
9 JEFFERSON,

in PADOVER 1106-11.
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structors. All of his educational plans insist
upon a positive doctrine of impartial and
mutually beneficent accommodation between the religious conscience and the state
schools. The New York prayer gave offense to no denominational confession. On
the contrary, it was willingly recited precisely because it was in full accord with
professed beliefs. We do not say that
Thomas Jefferson should be considered the
constitutional oracle of government relations with religion in education. But if the
Supreme Court chooses to quote him, it
ought to have recourse to the very documents that give his own explicit direct and
pertinent testimony. Whether the Court
might then be still willing to follow him
remains at this time an open question.
One of the most engaging enterprises of
the high tribunal is the frequency with
which it employs James Madison's justly
famed Memorialand Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments of 1785 and the
ease with which its meaning is bent beyond
its authentic purpose. In 1784, Patrick
Henry proposed to the Virginia Assembly
a "Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion" with the expectation that such a comprehensive tax
support would find acceptance with all
Christians to take place of the abrogated
provision for the support of the Anglican
ministers alone. It was against this preference through tax support of a religion, a
broadly defined christianity under the benign mantle of the Anglican Establishment,
that Madison directed his famed Memorial.
Who does not see that the same authority
which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish
with the same ease any particular sect of
Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?
That the same authority which can force a
citizen to contribute three pence only of
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his property for the support of any one
establishment, may force him to conform
to any other establishment in all cases
whatsoever. 1
The New York prayer was singularly free
of any of these Madisonian premonitions.
It allowed Christians of every denomination and non-Christians of any confession
to join in a unifying corporate prayer
wholly of their own choice and in accord
with their own religious conscience. Fifty
signers of the Declaration of Independence
-34 Episcopalians, 13 Congregationalists,
6 Presbyterians, 1 Baptist, 1 Quaker, and 1
Catholic---confessed publicly to self-evident
truths in the common patrimony of human
nature which the Creator had endowed
with certain inalienable rights. And Paul of
Tarsus, Jewish Apostle of Christianity
among the Gentiles, taught that knowledge
of God is open to human reason apart from
the teachings of divine revelation.
As for the Court's reference to James
Madison, one may note that, apart from
its misleading use of his Memorial, it
scarcely takes any cognizance of Madison's
own unequivocal explanation of the scope
and meaning of the no establishment clause
recorded in the congressional debates. 12
And further, it takes no note of the significant fact that ex-President Madison was
one of the Commissioners for the University of Virginia for whom Jefferson drafted
the educational plan of 1818 for submission
to the legislature of the state, which declares that:
[rihe proofs of ....
God, the creator, preserver, and supreme ruler of the universe,
the author of all the relations of morality,
and of the laws and obligations these infer,
11

2 TIE

WRITINGS

OF JAMES MADISON

(Hunt ed. 1901). (Emphasis added.)
12
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727 (1789).
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will be within the province of the professor
of ethics; to which adding the developments
of these moral obligations, of those in
which all sects agree, with a knowledge of
the languages, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin,
a basis will be formed common to all sects.
Psychology and Law
The establishment clause, the Supreme
Court said, does "not depend upon any
showing of direct governmental compulsion
and is violated by the enactment of laws
which establish an official religion whether
the laws operate directly to coerce the nonobserving or not." It may be that the Court
was simply saying that, as in England today, direct governmental compulsion need
not be a necessary incidence of proscribed
establishment even though it almost always
entails at least indirect coercive pressure.
In a word, the Court ruled the element of
compulsion to be constitutionally non-relevant and not as controlling as it had held
in the McCollum and Zorach cases.
Indirect coercive pressure upon the religious nonconformist is everywhere in the
air we breathe, apart from those circumstances where there is governmental provision for religious expression in public institutions. It takes its strongest emotional
experience in a constraining feeling of
embarrassment. This is generally the concomitant of most acts of dissent and nonconformity. Public law is committed to the
defense of individual rights, to the remedy
and redress of hurt rights, not hurt feelings
unless the hurt is such that it effectively
impedes the free exercise of personal choice.
Public law is not required to convert the
psychology of dissent into a constitutional
principle. It is not the function of law to
remove the situations wherein contrary
choices may engender contrary feelings.
The dissenter must be the first to acknowl-

8
edge that the condition for his own dissent
is to live and let live. Good will in a community rests in great measure on people
leaving others to their own choices. No man
is an island to himself in society. Robinson
Crusoe was seemingly free from any social
inhibitions until one day he noticed the
footprints of another and from that moment on, the law of mutual adjustment and
tolerance set in. The right of the conscientious objector is to shield his own conscience, not to strike down the religious
rights of his neighbors. We are all conscientious objectors and none of us should
enjoy an exclusive privilege to the preju13
dice of others.
If words have substantive meaning, a
"captive audience" is an audience whose
involuntary presence is forcibly detained or
whose involuntary participation is compelled. To have denied the school children
the choice of joining in the recitation of the
prayer was to deny them the opportunity
of sharing in the spiritual heritage of our
nation. The governmental denial of freedom of choice is as much coercion as the
13 Jewish Orthodox want an exception for their
ritual slaughter of animals in humane slaughter
laws. Jehovah's Witnesses are exempt from the
salute to the flag. Pacifists object to combatant
and noncombatant

military service.

Christian

Scientists are excused from hygiene courses. One
atheist child wiped out a voluntary cooperative
arrangement of five years standing by eight
hundred Protestants, about twenty Catholics, and

thirty Jews for religious instruction in public
schools. Sabbatarians oppose Sunday Laws.
Catholics oppose the use of public funds for the

promotion of birth control instructions at home
and in any foreign aid program. The Amish
raise religious objections to the Social Security
tax. These are but a handful of the instances
of legally and politically effective protests. Is

there any room for conscientious protest against
godless education in public schools? Would
Thomas Jefferson's protest be heeded today?
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imposing of an action. The argument that
public law is required to ensure the conscientious dissenter impervious to indirect
coercive pressure, divisiveness, and the
likelihood of social stigma and isolation
that may possibly follow upon a governmental program of religious accommodation, bears within itself a premise of
assault upon the salute to the flag in our
public schools to which the Jehovah Witnesses oppose their religious conscience.
We have travelled a full and truly vicious
circle. From religious persecution, intolerance and church establishment to benign
tolerance-to disestablishment-to equality
of all faiths before the law-to equality of
belief and nonbelief before the law-and
now to the secularist and the religious dissenter's intolerance of religious belief in
public law. The wry irony is that this is
being done, we are told, in the name of and
for the sake of religious liberty.
We are losing by default. We have taken
our spiritual heritage for granted. We have
allowed a creeping gradualism of secularism under one specious pretext after another to take over our public schools. A
vociferous and highly organized pressure
group is exerting its own form of indirect
coercive pressure upon the American community. Determined to deflect our national
traditions and heritage from their authentic
historic course, it is cutting a devisive swath
across the nation, advertising for clients to
challenge in court what is obnoxious to
them. Whoever works for the destruction
of the positive doctrine of accommodation
and mutual adjustment must shoulder the
blame for uprooting the bonds of concord
and friendship and forcibly injecting bitter
antagonisms in our pluralistic society. Political and legal action alone cannot create
the moral and social impulses which are the
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conditions of harmony in a community.
With full regard for the radical and primary rights of all parents to guide the education of their children in public schools,
as well as in independent private schools,
members of a local community can strive
with persevering good will to find a reasonable accommodation and mutual adjustment of one another's choices. In this way
law becomes-as it ought-the formal expression of the practical wisdom of a selfregulating community. Dissidents and consentients should be motivated to the
exercise of cultivated rights of men living
in fellowship and not as strangers in a contest of absolute and conflicting claims.
The more we examine the context of the
New York prayer and the circumstances
attending its optional recitation, the more
we discern the vast possibilities it offered
for the increase of friendly community life.
First, the children and their approving
parents of different faiths and church affiliations came together in a prayer based on
the common bonds of their religious beliefs.
Their religious sectarianism was in no way
experienced as a barrier to the brotherhood
of all men under the Fatherhood of God.
One would suppose that with all the adult
incantations about the intercredal relations
and the counsels-on all sides--of charity
and good-will against divisiveness, here indeed was a truly unitive bond of intercredal
relations in the most sensitive time of the
school children's formative years.
Second, it provided an opportune and
excellent educational training and habituation to the exercise of individual choice in
the midst of others according to the
vaunted American boast of individualism
and free self-expression. Religious differences are a very broad fact even for the

most enlightened adults, and social adjustment in this matter is essential to good
community relations. Should not the
youngsters mature gradually in this delicate experience with civility toward one
another without resentment and without
inhibition? The circumstances for the corporate prayer provided an early schooling
both for the dissidents and the consentients
to advance in mutual reverence for one
another's religious choices.
Third, the dissenter and the minority
must surely be shielded from majoritarian
imposition. So too must the majority be
protected from the unilateral dictation of
the absolute dissenter. It is indeed a strange
pathology of our time that when people in
increasing numbers freely choose to act
agreeably in unison there is less cause for
public gratification than in the uncompromising protestations of the dissenter. The
numerical superiority of a consensual
agreement should not be constitutionally
suspect, and if conformity is the flower of
human freedom, the wider the area of religious consensus among the variety of religious confessions, the greater will be the
harmony among men of good will. Only
when the dissenter treasures the liberties
of others as his own and insists on equal
freedom and the same legal immunity for
opposing choices that he demands for himself, then will we be sure that he acts in
the name of law and justice.
No one can deny that public law is
burdened with an almost insurmountable
task when it is confronted with the problems of religious pluralism. We are of the
opinion that the voluntary nondenominational prayer was possibly one of the best,
and at that, a minimal resolution of this
thorny moral-legal problem.
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Separation and Relation
Separation of Church and State in American law is uniquely an American experience. Its meaning derives from our own
constitutional history from the days of the
Northwest Ordinance to the recent construction of the chapel at the Air Force
Academy in Colorado. Our separation of
Church and State is a positive affirmation,
not a negative protestation. Its paramount
purpose is to preserve unimpaired and inviolable the freedom and independence of
both Church and State. It is but the
counterpart of an orderly and harmonious
relationship of friendly powers, a relationship of cordial cooperation and of benevolent accommodation, not a relationship of
14
mutually exclusive isolation. In Everson
the Court held for benevolent impartiality
for believers and unbelievers equally alike.
In Zorach-5 a positive doctrine of accom"New Jersey cannot consistently with the 'establishment of religion' clause of the First
Amendment contribute tax-raised funds to the
support of an institution which teaches the
tenets and faith of any church. On the other
hand, other language of the amendment commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion.
Consequently, it cannot exclude individual
Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists,
Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians,
or the members of any other faith, because of
14

their faith or lack of it, from receiving the

benefits of public welfare legislation. While we
do not mean to intimate that a state could
not provide transportation only to children attending public schools, we must be careful, in
protecting the citizens of New Jersey against
state-established churches, to be sure that we
do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from
extending its general state law benefits to all its
citizens without regard to their religious beliefs." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 16 (1947). (Emphasis added.)
15"We are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee the

modation was opposed to a neutrality of

total abstention, of indifference, suspicion
and hostility. The New York prayer was
indeed a reasonable and proper accommodation to the spiritual needs of our people
in accordance with the spiritual heritage of
freedom to worship as one chooses. We make
room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds
as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary.
We sponsor an attitude on the part of the government that shows no partiality to any one
group and that lets each flourish according to
the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its
dogma. When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events
to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public
service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it
may not would be to find in the Constitution a
requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would
be preferring those who believe in no religion
over those who do believe." Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952). (Emphasis added.)
In the Zorach opinion which Mr. Justice
Douglas wrote, he listed, with apparent approval
and as giving substance to his argument, several tax-supported religious exercises by public
officials and in public institutions: "Prayers in
our legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive;
the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a
holiday; 'so help me God' in our courtroom
oaths-these and other references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public
rituals, our ceremonies, would be flouting the
First Amendment. A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication with
which the Court opens each session: 'God save
the United States and this Honorable Court.' "
In Engel v. Vitale, Justice Douglas has forgotten the fastidious objector and attached himself to an absolutizing principle of government
financing of religious activity (and every governmental action is tax-supported) that would
abrogate the multitude of governmental involvements in religious exercises which he had cited
with approval in Zorach. Now, apparently, a
taxpayer may have stronger claims before Justice Douglas as a fastidious financier than as a
fastidious conscientious objector.
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our country. What absolute right has a
dissenter to protest against such an orderly
harmony when the government acts to
foster the relevance of religion to our national existence according to the cherished
traditions of our country? To what purpose
then may a court reason, "If this is allowed
to take place, dire consequences will therefore inevitably follow." Politics, social relations, and public law cannot be regulated
solely by narrow legal ergotisms. Each
human experience is invested with sensibilities of its own times and the present may
presage a future wholly alien to the heavy
hand of the past. The law of progress is
applicable to public law as to other human
enterprises. Far from being a dark beginning, a first experiment on our liberties, a
portent of dangers to come, the New York
prayer was, on the contrary, a refined product of American constitutional history on
Church-State relations, sensitive to the
rights of conscience of all-of parents and
their children, of participants and nonparticipants, of equal neutrality between believer and nonbeliever, of impartiality
among all the religious confessions, with
due regard to the government's role to
foster in public schools the relevance of
belief in God to our national existenceand all above with immunity for personal
choice.
Every generation of Americans has admitted to the role of the government in
attesting to the religious foundations of our
republic and official composition or adoption of divine invocations has been one of
the traditional government practices in a
great variety of government-supported religious exercises: the Presidential proclamations of days of prayer and thanksgiving,
the prayerful invocation in fifty state constitutions, the prayer which opens each day's

session of the Supreme Court, the religiou

inscription on our coinage and currency,"
16 Occasionally one hears and reads of stntu
ments (recently, by Rev. Dean Kelley of tir,'_
Department of Religious Liberty, Council of the
Churches of Christ) that religious inscriptions
on coins and currency are a profane use of C vine invocations. Really, no one may a.e.ic
conclusively that there must be religious
scriptions on our coinage. But given the ja-.
by congressional enactment, one may qucsL:C,'
the charge of impropriety of the employmr1t
of divine references on our currency. Radicall,'
it is a question of asceticism. Optimistic aszcLcism affirms that the original goodness o. Cvine creation forever retains the image of gvL:liness against any evil doing. All things re!m;0u
sacred and for this reason St. Paul wrote th ,t
all creation calls out "Abba Pater" and our Flvine Lord said that the stones would cry ouL .1
His praise if the jubilant shouts of the clitdren had been stifled. Through the centur,,
men have quarried stones and marble to raise
magnificent houses of worship. Most of .
tangible articles used in divine services arc c;
gold, silver and the finest raiment. There is tcj
a somber asceticism once prevalent among th:e
English and American Puritans which saw t. c
danger of distraction or interference in t..,
instrumentalities to the direct communica:i.
of the human heart with God. This view, however, is not relevant to the issue. The charge ol
profane use rests logically upon a presupposition of Manichaeism which considers corporeal
and material things as somehow vitiated, taintL:1,
and imbued with a radical principle for evil in
eternal contest with the spiritual principle of
Goodness for the allegiance of men. In t.11
view, material things in no way can give glory
to God. Optimistic asceticism affirms, on t:1contrary, that the source of evil does not spring
from things-falsitas non ex rebus sed ex p',ccatis (St. Augustine) but from a love that i;
not God-centered-nonfaciunt bonos vel malos
mores nisi boni vel mali amores (St. Augustine). Now, optimistic asceticism does not demand nor require that there be divine invocations on currencies. But it does deny that such
inscriptions on coinage are a profane use. The
are in accord with the dominical prayer for
daily bread and may serve as a telling reminder
that commercial instruments of exchange are
not to be debauched by dishonest trafficking
Also, religious-minded citizens may wish divine
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in our national anthem and motto, and in
the salute to the flag-not to mention the
public financing of legislative and military
chapels and chaplaincies by the state and
national governments. Now if federal and
state government officials and public institutions may engage in religious activity
why should the first amendment operate to
greater duress upon a local school board
and the school children who wish to say a
prayer together? The New York prayer
was no more a violation of the no establishment clause in public school activities than
the optional participation in the singing of
the national anthem, the Pledge of Allegiance, the released time religious instruction program, and in court proceedings, the
statutory alternate of testifying under oath
or by affirmation. In Zorach, we were told
that the "problem, like many problems on
constitutional law, is one of degree." But
in the prayer case, the Court perceived an
absolutizing principle which posed a threat
to government and religion.
One Nation Under God
It is not in any way intimated that a
civic corporate prayer so much in evidence
in our public institutions and in our national documents would, if excluded from
our public schools, bear within itself a
"bad tendency" rule that might inexorably
work to the development of a godless state
in America. But in our times we have seen
a highly civilized society whose government
gradually restricted in their civil institutions
the official profession of belief and depend-

ence upon God and withdrew religious exercises exclusively to churches and homes.
But when the tragic hour of conflicting allegiances bore upon its citizens, they
obeyed with passioned submission and
gratified acquiescence a supreme and absolute statal authority to the complete destruction of the state and to the enduring
shame of their religious confessions. Perhaps the United States Supreme Court
might have allowed a "good tendency" rule
to be immanent in the civic corporate
prayer to impress on all alike-on the participants and the nonparticipants-that
there is a higher allegiance to God under
which men must rule, that no patriotism
may obey against the moral law, that personal immunity against arbitrary power is
a divine mandate. It is not without profound symbolism that public authority
should be a party to an acknowledgement
of dependence upon God.
Thomas Jefferson once wrote:
Can the liberties of a nation be thought secure, when we have removed their own
firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the
people that these liberties are the gifts of
God?17
Public schools should share in the task of
transmitting to our school children the relevance of a free order among men to the
Divine Author of all liberties and accordingly allow this conviction to abide and
deepen among the rising generation of
Americans.
17 Quoted
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